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Summary
How would the frontier have evolved in the absence of homestead policies? I ap-
ply a matrix completion method to predict the counterfactual time-series of frontier
state capacity had there been no homesteading. In placebo tests, the matrix comple-
tion method outperforms synthetic controls and other regression-based estimators in
terms of minimizing prediction error. Causal estimates signify that homestead poli-
cies had significant and long-lasting negative impacts on state government expenditure
and revenue. These results are similar to difference-in-difference estimates that exploit
variation in the timing and intensity of homestead entries aggregated from 1.46 million
individual land patent records.
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Political scientists are increasingly interested in patterns of state development across time
and place. Several scholars (e.g., Bensel, 1990; Murtazashvili, 2013; Frymer, 2014) theorize a
relationship between mid-nineteenth century public land policies and the development of the
state, arguing that policies designed to transfer public land to private individuals increased
the bureaucratic capacity of the U.S. federal government to administer land.
Public land policies had long-lasting impacts on state capacity, or the ability of govern-
ments to finance and implement policies (Besley and Persson, 2010). I explore the role of two
U.S. public land policies in shaping state capacity: the Homestead Act (HSA) of 1862, which
opened for settlement hundreds of millions of acres of western frontier land, and the Southern
Homestead Act (SHA) of 1866, which opened over 46 million acres of land for homesteading.
I provide evidence that homesteads authorized under these laws had significant long-run
impacts on the capacity of frontier state governments.
The view that the western frontier had long-lasting impacts on the evolution of democratic
institutions can be traced to Turner (1956). Turner’s “frontier thesis” posited that homestead
policies acted as a “safety valve” for relieving pressure from congested urban labor markets
in eastern states. The view of the frontier as a “safety valve” has been explored by Ferrie
(1997), who finds evidence in a linked census sample of substantial migration to the frontier
by unskilled workers and considerable gains in wealth for these migrant workers. Homestead
policies not only offered greater economic opportunities to eastern migrants, but also the
sparse population on the western frontier meant that state and local governments competed
with each other to attract migrants in order to lower local labor costs and to increase land
values and tax revenues. Frontier governments offered migrants broad access to cheap land
and property rights, unrestricted voting rights, and a more generous provision of schooling
and other public goods (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2005).
Garc´ıa-Jimeno and Robinson (2008) test the frontier thesis in a global context and con-
clude that the economic effect of the frontier depends on the quality of political institutions
at the time of frontier expansion. Frontier expansion promotes equitable outcomes only
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when societies are initially democratic. When institutional quality is weak, the existence of
frontier land can yield worse developmental outcomes because non-democratic political elites
can monopolize frontier lands. Historical scholars have noted that public land policies were
often exploited by land speculators, ranchers, miners, and loggers, to accumulate public land
and extract natural resources during the early stages of capitalist development (Gates, 1942;
Murtazashvili, 2013). According to this view, homesteading laws were de jure social polices
but de facto corporate welfarism.
The paper makes a methodological contribution in applying an alternative method for
estimating causal impacts of policy interventions on time-series cross-section data. Build-
ing on a new literature that uses machine learning algorithms such as L1-regularized linear
regression (Doudchenko and Imbens, 2016) or deep neural networks (Poulos, 2017) for coun-
terfactual prediction, I apply a matrix completion method to predict the treated unit time-
series in the absence of the intervention. I perform placebo tests and find that the matrix
completion method outperforms the synthetic control method and other regression-based
estimators in terms of minimizing prediction error. In addition, I show how to evaluate the
overall effect of the policy intervention using a randomization inference procedure in which
approximately unbiased p-values are obtained under minimal assumptions.
The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, I overview the historical context of homestead
policies and its relationship to state capacity and land inequality; Section 3 describes the
method of matrix completion for counterfactual prediction, benchmarks the method against
alternative estimators, and describes the inferential procedure. In Section 4, I report the
results of placebo tests to verify the consistency of the matrix completion estimator. I then
present estimates of the long-run impacts of homestead policies on state capacity. Section 5
reports DID estimates of the effect of homesteads on state capacity and land inequality, and
Section 6 concludes.
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2 Historical background
The 1862 HSA opened up hundreds of millions of acres of western public land for settlement.
The HSA provides that any adult citizen — including women, immigrants who had applied
for citizenship, and freed slaves following the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment— could
apply for a homestead grant of 160 acres of frontier land. Applicants were required to live
and make improvements on the land for five years before filing to claim a homestead land
grant.
Under the HSA, the bulk of newly surveyed land on the western frontier was reserved for
homesteads, although the law did not end sales of public land. The explicit goal of the HSA
was to liberalize the homesteading requirements set by the Preemption Act of 1841, which
permitted individuals already inhabiting public land to purchase up to 160 acres at $1.25 per
acre before the land was put up for sale. The implicit goal was to promote rapid settlement
on the western frontier and reduce federal government’s enforcement costs (Allen, 1991).
In the pre-Reconstruction South, public land was not open to homestead but rather
unrestricted cash entry, which permitted the direct sale of public land to private individuals
of 80 acres or more for at least $1.25 an acre. The 1866 SHA restricted cash entry and reserved
for homesteading over 46 million acres of public land, or about one-third of the total land
area in the five southern public land states (PLS) (Lanza, 1999, pp. 13). PLS are states
created out of the public domain. In the South, these states include Alabama, Arkansas,
Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi. Western PLS include the 25 states that comprise the
Midwestern, Southwestern, and Western U.S. (except Hawaii).
Homestead policies were often exploited by speculators and corporations through fraud-
ulent filings. Speculators and corporations engaged in the practice of paying individuals to
stake out homesteads in order to extract resources from the land with no intention of filing
for the final patent. In the South, these “dummy entry-men” were used by timber and min-
ing companies to extract resources while the cash entry restriction of the SHA was in effect.
When the restriction was removed, there was no need for fraudulent filings because the larger
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companies could buy land in unlimited amounts at a nominal price (Gates, 1940, 1979). The
same pattern of fraudulent filings existed in the West, where Murtazashvili (2013) argues
that speculators benefited disproportionately from public land policies because the economic
balance of power tilted toward the wealthy. Gates (1942) characterizes western speculators
who bought land in bulk prior to the 1889 restriction as being influential in state and local
governments, resistant to paying taxes, and opposed to government spending.
3 Matrix completion for counterfactual prediction
An important problem in the social sciences is estimating the effect of a binary intervention
on an outcome over time. When interventions take place at an aggregate level (e.g., a
state), researchers make causal inferences by comparing the post-intervention (“post-period”)
outcomes of affected (“treated”) units against the outcomes of unaffected (“control”) units.
A common approach to the problem is the synthetic control method, which predicts the
counterfactual outcomes of treated units by finding a convex combination of control units
that match the treated units in term of lagged outcomes. Correlations across units that are
assumed to remain constant over time.
This paper applies the method of matrix completion via nuclear norm minimization
(MC-NNM) proposed by Athey et al. (2017) to predict counterfactual outcomes. Matrix
completion methods (e.g., Mazumder et al., 2010) exploit correlations within and across
units, but ignore the temporal dimension of the data. These methods typically assume miss-
ing values are sampled uniformly at random (Yoon et al., 2018); in contrast, the MC-NNM
estimator allows for patterns of missing data to have a time-series dependency structure.
Let Y denote a N×T matrix of outcomes for each unit i = 1, . . . ,N at time t = 1, . . . ,T.
Y is incomplete because we observe each element Yit for only the control units and the
treated units prior to time of initial treatment exposure, T0. Let O denote the set of (it)
values that are observed and M the set of (it) missing values. Let the values of the N× T
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complete matrix M be Mit = 1 if (it) ∈ M and Mit = 0 if (it) ∈ O. Note that the process
that generates M is referred to the assignment mechanism in the causal inference literature
(Imbens and Rubin, 2015) and the missing data mechanism in missing data analysis (Little
and Rubin, 2014).
We cannot directly observe counterfactual outcomes and we instead wish to impute miss-
ing values in Y for treated units with Mit = 1. In an observational setting, units are part of
the assignment mechanism that generates M and patterns of missing data follow one of two
specific structures. In the case of simultaneous adoption of treatment, a subset of units are
exposed to treatment at time T0 and every subsequent period. The second structure arises
from the staggered adoption setting, where T0 may vary across treated units. In either case,
there are selection biases because the probability of missingness may depend on the unob-
served data. The goal is to accurately estimate the effect of a policy intervention despite
incomplete data subject to selection bias.
3.1 Matrix completion estimator
Matrix completion methods attempt to impute missing entries in a low-rank matrix by
solving a convex optimization problem via NNM, even when relatively few values are observed
in Y (Cande`s and Recht, 2009; Candes and Plan, 2010). The MC-NNM estimator is
Yit = L
∗
it +
P∑
p=1
Xipβ
∗
p + γ
∗
i + δ
∗
t + it (1)
where L∗ a low-rank matrix to be estimated, X is a N×P matrix of normalized, unit-specific
covariates, and γ∗ and δ∗ are vectors of unit and time effects, respectively. The identifying
condition is that, conditional on L∗, the error vector  is independent across rows (units)
and E[|L∗ + β∗ + γ∗ + δ∗] = 0. Estimating L∗ involves minimizing the sum of squared
errors via nuclear norm regularized least squares:
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Lˆ, βˆ = min
L,β
[ ∑
(it)∈O
1
|O|
(
Yit − Lit −
P∑
p=1
Xipβp − γi − δt
)2
+ λ‖L‖?
]
, (2)
where λ is the regularization term on the nuclear norm ‖·‖? — i.e., sum of singular values
— and its value is selected by cross-validation. The algorithm for (2) iteratively replaces
missing values with those recovered from a singular value decomposition (SVD) (Mazumder
et al., 2010). Amjad et al. (2018) propose an alternative approach of approximating L∗ via
SVD, and then using linear regression on the “de-noised” matrix, rather than relying on
matrix norm regularizations.
Athey et al. (2017) note two drawbacks of the MC-NNM estimator: first, it penalizes
the errors for each value with Mit = 0 equally without regard to the fact that Pr(Mit) = 1
(i.e., the propensity score) increases with t. Second, the columns of  may be autocorrelated
because the estimator does not account for time-series dependencies in the observed data.
3.2 Simulations
In this section, I evaluate the accuracy of the MC-NNM estimator on the following three
datasets common to the synthetic control literature, with the actual treated unit removed
from each dataset: Abadie and Gardeazabal’s (2003) study of the economic impact of ter-
rorism in the Basque Country during the late 1960s (N = 16, T = 43); Abadie et al.’s (2010)
study of the effects of a large-scale tobacco control program implemented in California in
1988 (N = 38, T = 31); and Abadie et al.’s (2015) study of the economic impact of the 1990
German reunification on West Germany (N = 16, T = 44). For each trial run, I randomly
select half of the control units to be treated and predict their counterfactual outcomes for
periods following a randomly selected T0. I compare the predicted values to the observed
values by calculating the root-mean squared error, RMSE =
∑
it |L∗ − Lˆ|2/
√
NT.
I benchmark the MC-NNM estimator against the following methods:
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(a) DID Regression of Y on γ and δ and a binary treatment variable (Athey et al.,
2017)
(b) HR-EN Horizontal regression with elastic net regularization (Athey et al., 2017)
(c) PCA Regularized iterative principal components analysis (Ilin and Raiko, 2010)
(d) SC-ADH Synthetic control approached via exponentiated gradient descent (Abadie
et al., 2010)
(e) SVD Low-rank SVD approximation estimated by expectation maximization (Troy-
anskaya et al., 2001)
(f) VT-EN Vertical regression with elastic net regularization (Athey et al., 2017).
Figure 1 reports the average prediction error of the estimators in a staggered treatment
adoption setting, with the estimates jittered horizontally to reduce overlap. Error bars
represent 95% prediction intervals calculated using the standard deviation of the prediction
distribution for 20 trial runs.
Across all estimators, the average RMSE decreases and prediction intervals narrow as
T0/T approaches unity because the estimators have more information to generate coun-
terfactual predictions. The MC-NNM estimator generally outperforms all other estimators
in terms of average RMSE across different ratios T0/T. The strong performance of the
MC-NNM estimator can be attributed to the fact that it is capable of using additional in-
formation in the form of pre-intervention (“pre-period”) observations of the treated units,
whereas the regression-based estimators rely only on the pre-period observations of control
units to predict counterfactuals. Figure SM-1 in the Supporting Materials (SM) presents a
similar pattern of results in a simultaneous adoption setting.
3.3 Hypothesis testing
Consider a setup with J control units indexed by i = 1, . . . , J and Q treated units indexed
by i = J + 1, . . . ,N. The optimization program (2) imputes the missing entries in Y :
Yˆit = Lˆit for J + 1 ≤ i ≤ N and T0 + 1 ≤ t ≤ T.
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(a) Basque Country terrorism data, Nt = 8 (b) California smoking ban data, Nt = 19
(c) West German reunification data, Nt = 8
Figure 1: Placebo tests under staggered treatment adoption: , DID; , HR-EN; ,
MC-NNM; , PCA; , SC-ADH; , SVD; , VT-EN.
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The inferred causal effect of the intervention on the treated group is the difference between
the observed outcomes of the treated units and the counterfactual outcomes that would have
been observed in the absence of the intervention,
αˆit = Yit − Yˆit for J + 1 ≤ i ≤ N and T0 + 1 ≤ t ≤ T.
Taking the difference-in-means between treated unit observed outcomes and predicted out-
comes gives the per-period estimated average causal effect across treated units:
ˆ¯αt =
1
Q
N∑
i=J+1
αˆit for T0 + 1 ≤ t ≤ T. (3)
Chernozhukov et al. (2017) propose a randomization inference approach for testing the
sharp null hypothesis H0 : ˆ¯α = α¯
o, where {α¯ot}Tt=T0 is a trajectory of per-period average
effects under the null. The test statistic suggested by the authors is constructed so that we
reject higher values:
Sq( ˆ¯α) =
 1√
T?
T∑
t=T0+1
| ˆ¯αt|q
q , (4)
where T? = T− T0 and q is a constant.
Letting ˆ¯αpi denote the vector of per-period average causal effects estimated for each
permutation pi ∈ Π, the randomization p-value is
pˆ = 1− 1
Π
∑
pi∈Π
I
{
Sq( ˆ¯αpi) < Sq( ˆ¯α)
}
, (5)
where I(·) denotes the indicator function.
Following Chernozhukov et al. (2017), (5) is estimated by permuting Y across the time
dimension. The idea for permuting time periods rather than treatment assignment, as pro-
posed by Abadie et al. (2010), is that if the data are stationary and weakly dependent, which
is often the case in an aggregate time-series setting, then the distribution of the error term
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 in (1) should be the same in the pre- and post-periods. Chernozhukov et al. (2017) prove
that the p-values resulting from their inferential procedure are approximately unbiased under
consistent estimation.
Permuation structures In the tests described below, three types of permutations are
used: i.i.d. random permutations of the time index t; i.i.d. block random permutations of
K = T/b non-overlapping blocks, where b is selected according to the optimal block length
for the dependent bootstrap (Politis and White, 2004); and moving block permutations that
circularly shift t by one period, resulting in T−1 permutations. The latter two permutations
are capable of preserving the dependence structure of the data and are thus appropriate for
weakly dependent data.
4 Impact of homestead policies on state capacity
In this section, I estimate the causal impacts of homestead policies on state capacity, as
measured by state government spending and revenue. I create measures of total expenditure
and revenue collected from the records of 48 state governments during the period of 1783 to
1932 (Sylla et al., 1993) and the records of 16 state governments during the period of 1933 to
1937 (Sylla et al., 1995a,b). Comparable measures for 48 states are drawn from U.S. Census
special reports for the years 1902, 1913, 1932, 1942, 1962, 1972, and 1982 (Haines, 2010).
The expenditure measure includes state government spending on education, social welfare
programs, and transportation. The revenue measure incorporates state government income
streams such as tax revenue and non-tax revenues such as land sales.
The data pre-processing steps are as follows. Each measure is inflation-adjusted according
to the U.S. Consumer Price Index (Williamson, 2017) and scaled by the total free population
in the decennial census (Haines, 2010). Missing values are imputed separately in the pre-
and -post-periods by carrying the last observation forward and remaining missing values
are imputed by carrying the next observation backward. The raw outcomes data are log-
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transformed to alleviate exponential effects. Lastly, I remove states with no variance in the
pre-period outcomes, resulting in complete N×T matrices of size 33× 159 and 34× 158 for
the expenditures and revenues outcomes, respectively.
In this application, PLS are the treated units and state land states — i.e., states that were
not crafted from the public domain and were therefore not directly affected by homestead
policies — serve as control units. This group includes states of the original 13 colonies,
Maine, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and West Virginia. The staggered adoption setting is
appropriate for the current application because T0 varies across states that were exposed to
homesteads following the passage of the HSA. I aggregate to the state level approximately
1.46 million individual land patent records authorized under the HSA. Land patent records
provide information on the initial transfer of land titles from the federal government and are
made accessible online by the U.S. General Land Office (https://glorecords.blm.gov).
Using these records, I determine that the earliest homestead entries occurred in 1869 in
about half of the western frontier states, about seven years following the enactment of the
HSA. In 1872, the first homesteads were filed in southern PLS. The timing and intensity of
homestead entries is graphed in Figure SM-2.
When estimating (1), unit-specific covariates include state-level average farm sizes mea-
sured in the 1860 and average farm values measured in the 1850 and 1860 censuses. In
theory, we should expect that homesteaders migrate to more productive land and thus ex-
cluding these pre-period measures of agricultural productivity may result in overestimating
the actual impact of homestead policies. To control for selection bias arising from differences
in access to frontier lands, I create a measure of railroad access using digitized railroad maps
provided by Atack (2013), which contain information on the year that each rail line was
built. Overlaying the railroad track map over historical county borders, I calculate the total
miles of operational track per square mile and aggregate the measure to the state-level.
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4.1 Placebo tests
Prior to presenting the main results, I assess the validity of the key assumption underlying the
approach by discarding post-period observations from the data. Treating t = {1, . . . ,T0 − τ}
as the pre-period, I estimate (4) and test the zero effect null hypothesis
H0 : Sq( ˆ¯αt) = 0 for T0 − τ + 1 ≤ t ≤ T0, (6)
where τ ∈ {1, 10, 25} and q ∈ {1, 2}.
Table 1 reports randomization p-values corresponding to each permutation structure
and value of τ and q. i.i.d. block and i.i.d. block p-values are calculated using |Π| =
1, 000 permutations. Moving block p-values are based on |Π| = T− 1 permutations. When
considering the revenue outcome, placebo tests yield two-sided p-values greater than the
significance level of α = 0.05, regardless of the value of q or permutation structure. These
results provide evidence in favor that the model is correctly specified. However, we can only
reject the null in the case of τ = 1 when considering the expenditure outcome.
Table 1: Placebo test p-values.
Expenditure Revenue
i.i.d. i.i.d. Block Moving Block i.i.d. i.i.d. Block Moving Block
τ
q
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 0.051 0.056 0.098 0.099 0.047 0.047 0.469 0.499 0.488 0.511 0.482 0.494
10 0.028 0.027 0.034 0.033 0.012 0.024 0.543 0.575 0.548 0.582 0.565 0.600
25 0.022 0.024 0.042 0.042 0.024 0.024 0.581 0.594 0.627 0.653 0.635 0.634
Further evidence of the unbiasedness of the estimator is provided in Figure SM-3, which
presents the results of placebo tests on control units using both pre- and post-period ob-
servations. Similar to the simulations on the synthetic control datasets discussed in Section
3.2, there are no missing entries because the actual treated units are removed prior to the
placebo tests. I randomly choose about half of the remaining control units as hypothetical
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treated units and predict their values for time periods following a randomly selected T0. The
MC-NNM estimator outperforms DID and SVD estimators in terms of minimizing RMSE
for each ratio T0/T. At T0/T ≥ 0.5, the estimator generally yields comparable error rates
to PCA, synthetic control, and vertical regression estimators.
4.2 Main estimates
In the main analyses, I fit the MC-NNM estimator described in (1) on the entirety of observed
entries in Y to recover its missing entries; i.e., the counterfactual outcomes of PLS. The top
panel of Figure 2 compares the observed time-series of treated units and control units along
with the predicted outcomes of treated units. The dashed vertical line represents the initial
treatment year of 1869. The observed means of the treated and control units are essentially
identical in the post-period. However, we are interested primarily in the difference in the
observed and predicted treated unit outcomes, which is the quantity ˆ¯αt, which corresponds
to the estimated per-period average causal effect of treatment exposure on the treated units.
These per-period causal impacts are plotted in the bottom panels, with 95% confidence
intervals estimated by taking ˆ¯αt ± 1.96 the standard error of the distribution of 1,000 block
bootstrap replicates of ˆ¯αt, with optimal block lengths selected by the procedure described
by Politis and White (2004).
The per-period impact time-series for both outcomes are essentially zero during the pre-
period and within the bounds of the bootstrap confidence intervals, which demonstrates that
the model is closely fitting the pre-period observations. Per-period impacts on state govern-
ment spending peak in 1870, at the same time most PLS were first exposed to homesteads,
representing a 0.18 [-0.35, 0.71] log increase in per-capita expenditure. By 1876, after most
PLS had been exposed to homesteads, homestead exposure decreases expenditure by 0.51
[-1.67, 0.66] log points, and the trajectory of causal impacts remains negative for the rest of
the time-series.
A similar pattern of results emerges when estimating the impacts of homesteads on
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state government revenue (Figure SM-4). Per-period impacts on revenue peak in 1873,
representing a 0.43 [-0.57, 1.44] log increase in per-capita revenues, at the same time southern
PLS are exposed to homesteads. The causal impacts on revenue quickly decrease and remain
negative for the remaining time-series; in 1877, exposure to homesteads confer a 0.45 [-1.51,
0.61] log point decrease in per-capita revenue.
The estimated bootstrap confidence intervals are useful for evaluating per-period causal
impacts but are not helpful in evaluating the overall effect of homestead policies. Table 2
reports the results of testing the null hypothesis:
H0 : Sq( ˆ¯αt) = 0 for T0 + 1 ≤ t ≤ T. (7)
In the table, Sq( ˆ¯α) corresponds to the test statistic described in (4) and each value
beneath is the randomization p-value corresponding to each permutation structure. We can
reject the null hypothesis (7) at the 5% level for both outcomes, both values of q, and
all three permutation schemes. Note that the relevant test statistic S( ˆ¯αt) measures the
trajectory of average causal effects in absolute terms and thus does not provide information
on the direction or evolution of the causal effects over time.
Table 2: Testing the null hypothesis (7).
Expenditure Revenue
q = 1 q = 2 q = 1 q = 2
Sq(ˆ¯α) 3.87 1.40 1.97 0.76
i.i.d. 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001
i.i.d. Block 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
Moving Block < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
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Figure 2: MC-NNM estimates of treatment exposure on state government expenditure, 1809
to 1982: , observed treated; , observed control; , counterfactual treated; ,
ˆ¯αt.
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5 DID estimation
The matrix completion approach estimates the impact of a binary exposure to treatment
on a continuous outcome. However, in this application a continuous form of treatment is
available in the form of homestead entries. Equation (8) estimates a continuous version of
the DID estimator described in Section 3.2, where the first difference comes from variation
in the date of initial exposure to homesteads, and the second difference comes from variation
in the intensity of homestead entries:
Yit = γi + δt + ψMit + φ (Mit ·Hit) +Xit + it. (8)
In this model, X is a matrix of unit- and time-varying covariates included to control for
parallel trends in agricultural productivity and access to frontier lands. Entries in the treat-
ment indicator M are set to Mit = 1 at t ≥ T0, where T0 varies across units. The continuous
treatment exposure variable Hit measures the per-capita statewide sum of homestead entries
in state i and year t. The coefficient corresponding to the interaction term, φˆ, is the esti-
mated average causal effect of exposure to homesteads. I use unit-stratified bootstrapped
samples to construct nonparametric standard errors for φˆ. The model assumes i.i.d. errors,
which understates the standard errors for δˆ when the regression errors are serially correlated,
or Corr(it, i,t−1) 6= 0, which can arise when the time-series lengths are not sufficiently long
to reliably estimate the data generating process. Bertrand et al. (2004) show that the strat-
ified bootstrap can be used to compute consistent standard errors when the number of units
is sufficiently large.
Similar to the case of binary treatment, the continuous DID estimator is adapted to a
setting of staggered adoption because the initial date of exposure to homesteads varies across
PLS. It should be emphasized that estimating (8) in a staggered adoption setting relies on
several strong assumptions regarding both the assignment mechanism — in this application,
the distribution of T0 — and the counterfactual outcomes of the treated units. The frame-
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work of Athey and Imbens (2018), for instance, assumes the distribution of T0 is completely
random conditional on the covariates. In the current application, this assumption ignores
the possibility that initial exposure to homesteads might be determined by unobserved fac-
tors. The framework also that the counterfactual outcomes at time t does not depend on the
future date of treatment exposure if t < T0 or the history of treatment exposure if t > T0.
Violations of these assumptions would arise if the homestead policies is anticipated prior to
T0 or if the size of frontier state government is determined by whether the state was exposed
early or late to homesteads.
5.1 DID estimates on state capacity
I estimate (8) on balanced state-year panel datasets of state government finances from the
years 1783 to 1982. The covariate matrix Xit includes measures of railroad access, farm sizes,
and farm values. Missing values in Xit are imputed separately in the time periods before
and after 1868, carrying the last observation forward and impute remaining missing values
by carrying the next observation backward.
Table 3 reports the DID treatment effect estimates and corresponding 95% confidence
intervals constructed using 1,000 state-stratified bootstrap samples. The estimates indicate
that a 10% increase in log per-capita homesteads is expected to significantly decrease log
per-capita stage government finances by about 0.1%. The point estimates are considerably
smaller in magnitude – albeit in the the same direction– as the per-period MC-NNM esti-
mates presented in Section 4.2. The bootstrap confidence intervals around the DID estimates
are considerably more narrow than those for the MC-NNM per-period impacts displayed in
Figure 2 and are potentially overoptimistic due to serial correlation in the DID regression
errors.
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Table 3: DID estimates: Impact of homestead entries on outcomes.
Expenditure Revenue Land inequality
Treatment effect (φˆ) -0.013 -0.012 -4.81 · 10−4
[-0.018, -0.009] [-0.017, -0.008] [-9.756 · 10−4, -4.636 · 10−5]
Adjusted R2 0.74 0.73 0.84
N 5,247 5,372 463
Includes farm size & railroad access Yes Yes No
Includes farm values Yes Yes Yes
Includes state & year effects Yes Yes Yes
5.2 Land inequality as a causal mechanism
Through which channels do homesteads affect state capacity? The political economy lit-
erature is largely in agreement that inequality and state capacity are inversely related. In
Besley and Persson’s (2009) framework, for example, greater economic power of the ruling
class reduces investment in state capacity. Similarly, Galor et al. (2009) propose a model
where wealthy landowners block education reforms because education favors industrial labor
productivity and decreases the value in farm rents. Inequality in this context can be thought
of as a proxy for the amount of de facto political influence elites have to block reforms and
limit the capacity of the state (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008).
To test whether homesteads affected future land inequality in frontier counties, I calculate
a commonly-used measure of land inequality based on the Gini coefficient of census farm
sizes. Gini-based land inequality measures are commonly used as proxy for the de facto
bargaining power of landed elites (e.g., Boix, 2003; Ziblatt, 2008; Ansell and Samuels, 2015).
Note that the Gini coefficient will underestimate land inequality in counties with high shares
of propertyless farmers because tenant farms are included in the farm size data, which is
problematic because farms can be operated by different tenants but owned by the same
landlord. I correct for this problem by adjusting the farm Gini coefficient by the ratio of
farms to adult males, as recommended by Vollrath (2013).
In Figure SM-5, a bivariate regression model yields a positive relationship between land
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inequality and state government finances during the period of 1860 to 1950, especially at
higher levels of inequality. This relationship points to inequality as a potential causal mech-
anism underlying the relationship between homesteads and state capacity. The inverse rela-
tionship agrees with the findings of Ramcharan (2010) and Vollrath (2013) in the context of
taxes, revenues, and public school spending at the county-level in 1890 and 1930.
Table 3 presents DID estimates of the impact of log per-capita homesteads on land
inequality at the state-level during the period of 1870 to 1950. Since land inequality is
measured every decennial, I aggregate homesteads to the next decennial year; e.g., the
number of homesteads measured in 1880 is the total for the years 1871 to 1880. Average
farm values are included in the regression as a proxy for agricultural productivity, which
might be associated with farm sizes approaching ideal scale and therefore land inequality.
I estimate that homesteads significantly decreased land inequality in frontier states: a 1%
increase in log per-capita homesteads is expected to lower land inequality by 4.81 · 10−6
points.
6 Conclusion
The findings of this paper signify that mid-nineteenth century homestead policies had long-
lasting impacts that can potentially explain contemporary differences in state government
capacity. MC-NNM and DID estimates imply that homestead policies — or the homestead
entries authorized by those policies — had significant and negative impacts on state gov-
ernment expenditure and revenue that lasted a century following its implementation. The
direction of these estimates contradicts the view that frontier state governments sought to
increase public investments in order to attract eastern migrants following the passage of the
HSA, and that homesteads would increase state and local tax bases. Instead, the results
conform with the view that homestead policies were exploited by land speculators and natu-
ral resource companies and that the rents from public land were appropriated by the private
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sector.
I explore land inequality as a possible causal mechanism underlying the relationship
between land reform and state capacity. First, I provide evidence of a positive relationship
between land inequality and state government finances and that the slope of correlation
increases at higher levels of inequality. A nonlinearity in the relationship between inequality
and state capacity can arise in theoretical models that incorporate economic differences in
political influence: greater income inequality reduces investments in fiscal capacity when
elites have a monopoly on political power, however when inequality gets too high, the poor
can impose redistribution through majority voting. Second, I present DID estimates that
reveal per-capita homesteads significantly lowered land inequality in frontier states; although,
the magnitude of the effect is negligible.
This paper makes a methodological contribution in applying matrix completion — a
machine learning method commonly used for user recommendation tasks — for estimating
causal impacts of policy interventions on time-series cross-sectional data. The promise of
the method is three-fold. First, the method can be easily understood within the frameworks
of modern causal inference and missing data imputation: we cannot directly observe the
counterfactual outcomes of treated units and wish to impute these values on the basis of the
observed values. Second, the method allows for patterns of missing data to have a time-series
dependency structure and is thus adaptable to settings with staggered treatment adoption.
Third, the method outperforms several other regression-based estimators in a battery of
placebo tests. The performance advantage can be attributed to the fact that it is capable
of using additional information in the form of pre-period observations of the treated units,
whereas other estimators rely only on the pre-period observations of control units to predict
counterfactuals.
Further research is needed to determine the conditions under which consistency holds.
Estimator consistency is required to obtain approximately unbiased p-values under the ran-
domization inference procedure.
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(a) Basque Country terrorism data, Nt = 8 (b) California smoking ban data, Nt = 19
(c) West German reunification data, Nt = 8
Figure 1: Placebo tests under simultaneous treatment adoption.
2
Figure 2: Per-capita homestead entries in state i and year t, 1869-1922.
3
(a) Expenditures, simultaneous adoption (b) Revenues, simultaneous adoption
(c) Expenditures, staggered adoption (d) Revenues, staggered adoption
Figure 3: Placebo tests under simultaneous and staggered treatment adoption, with Nt = 9.
4
Figure 4: MC-NNM estimates of treatment exposure on state government revenue, 1809 to
1982: , observed treated; , observed control; , counterfactual treated; , ˆ¯αt.
5
Figure 5: Land inequality (lagged by 10 years) vs. log per-capita revenue and expenditure,
1860-1950. Each point is a state-year observation. Lines represent generalized additive model
(GAM) fits to the data and shaded regions represent corresponding 95% confidence intervals.
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